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The Norwegian salmon industry has, in terms of production and economic results,
been a great success. However, due to environmental problems such as sea lice and
escapes, the industry encounters increasing resistance from many quarters, headed
by the wild salmon sport fishers. In order to improve the image of the industry, the
fisheries authorities have suggested four new reforms that all contribute to the
greening of the industry. At present, the outcome of these reforms is uncertain. The
article discusses the pros and cons of these reforms. It sees them as an introduction
to the next large battle for space, which is due to take place if the salmon industry is
going to expand as projected.
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The Norwegian aquaculture industry is at the crossroads. In the last 45 years, the produc-
tion of salmon has increased from less than 1,000 tons to 1.2 million tons in 2014. The in-
dustry has, over the years, become a financial success with significant repercussions in
many coastal communities. It is frequently referred to as “a Norwegian answer to IKEA”1
and is seen as one (of a few) promising sectors in terms of growth when the petroleum in-
dustry gradually has to be reduced. The future prospects are enormous, but the industry
is also facing increasing opposition from many different quarters in Norwegian society.
Currently, the main focus is on salmon escapes and the incidence of sea lice, which are
believed to have significant negative effects on wild salmon and trout. Sport fishers, pro-
fessional fishers, conservationists and recreational groups have demanded full stop and
no further increase in production, and they have been heard. Both the current and the
former Ministers of Fisheries have publicly declared that further growth is impossible
until the problems of sea lice and escapes have been solved or, at least, considerably re-
duced. Meanwhile, the fish farming companies have shown that they have the capacity
and market access for an increase of production. In this situation, both fish farmers and
authorities have been searching high and low for acceptable new solutions. Is it possible
to increase production while at the same time reducing the ecological footprint of the in-
dustry? In this article I shall describe four such initiatives, assess their possible effects and
discuss whether these instruments may contribute to a more sustainable aquaculture
industry, not only in Norway but also in other salmon producing countries where
Norwegian interests are involved. The article is based on several previous projects
(Hersoug and Johnsen 2012, Johnsen et al. 2014, Andreassen et al. 2014, Hovland et al.2015 Hersoug. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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40 years of contact with the aquaculture industry.
Theoretical perspectives on aquaculture regulations
Natural resource governance is based on interventions that regulate human behaviour
(Berkes 2008). These interventions are defined on the basis of assumptions about how hu-
man actions affect nature (Pálsson 2006). Because nature is not directly accessible, it has to
be represented through specific governable objects, which in turn become the foundation
for defining interventions (Johnsen et al. 2009, Johnsen 2013). Governable objects are con-
stituted when the components and processes in an ecosystem are represented symbolically.
Specific techniques are used to translate and assemble the components and processes into
bounded, homogenous objects that can be measured, quantified, or modelled in ways that
make it possible to create specific intervention mechanisms for governance, as is done with
a fish stock or with the maximum allowable biomass (MTB) in aquaculture.2
Aquaculture regulations, much like fisheries regulations, are public regulations. That
is, they are a distinct type of public regulation. From the early 1970s, there were two
main reasons for regulating access to this industry. The first applied to how much
should be produced and by whom. Salmon farming was a risky business and overpro-
duction could create bankruptcies and loss of private and public capital. Hence, volume
had to be controlled. The authorities also had a plan of using aquaculture as a means
to increase employment in rural coastal areas, facing severe problems as the fisheries
and processing industry were contracting. Therefore, the right to do fish farming was
directed to certain groups or persons. The measure to be used was licensing, combined
with limited production volume. The second reason applies to the environment. Fish
farming is regulated because it takes place in what is defined as common property
(coastal sea areas) and because fish farming involves important externalities. What one
fish farmer is doing may influence not only other farmers in the same area but also
other stakeholders in other sectors and industries. Consequently, regulating aquacul-
ture is done for different reasons, but they all depend on having legitimacy—that is, by
being accepted as valid by most stakeholders (Jentoft 2004).
Licenses or concessions have been used in Norway for more than 100 years to regulate,
among other sectors, hydroelectric power. They were used in regulating access to the fish-
eries, and were quite familiar when the Ministry of Fisheries was going to limit the num-
ber of fish farmers in the 1970s. As pointed out by Mikalsen (1983), the administrative
allocation of rights to participation in aquaculture does not imply the elimination of com-
petition, but that access to competition is regulated and normally limited. Licensing cer-
tain operators means that these fish farmers are allowed to enter an exclusive market, a
market with limited participation. According to Hernes (1978), such licensing may be seen
as foreclosing the decisions of the market. Without intervention, the market would have
eliminated many operators and, in the next round, probably opened the arena for other
operators. Hence, the judgment of the market is not effectuated because the effects may
be deemed too costly or unwanted in political terms. What is worth noting is that this
transfer of responsibility for access from the market to a public hierarchy makes public
authorities responsible for the results of the allocation, while the fish farmers acquire
status as clients. Hence, the critical issue is how the aquaculture authorities organize the
allocation in terms of goals, criteria, and administrative processes (Hersoug 2005).
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ment measure, namely the allocation of space, or locality. Deciding where to place the
aquaculture activities thus became part of marine spatial planning. Marine planning is
a process whereby coastal space becomes framed as a governable object (Johnsen et al.
2014). Coastal space as a governable object is not equal to the undefined natural space,
but a translation of an ungovernable complexity into a defined, governable object that
can serve as a foundation for governance interventions. In a marine setting, this takes
place when a variety of biotic and abiotic components in a specific location are translated
into specific spatial properties that can be defined on a map representing the space.
When aquaculture licenses became freely transferable from 1991 onwards, this was a
step in the direction of using the market to a larger degree than before. The authorities
were less interested in who did the farming than in how they farmed. It was not a ques-
tion of substituting one system for the other (from plan to market), but how to change
the mix of the two steering systems. However, such changes do not happen haphaz-
ardly. They are mediated through institutions. Here we are not going into detail about
the many definitions of institutions, but suffice to say that many theories are based on
rational choice theory, where institutions are seen as sets of positive (inducements) and
negative (constraints) motivations for individuals, in which the individual utility
maximization is acting as the dynamic element in the institutional set-up. Against this
instrumental perception of institutions, it is possible to supply a more sociological con-
cept, where management institutions are embedded in a larger social structure (Polanyi
1944, Granovetter 1985). These authors argue that markets and other coordinating
mechanisms are shaped and are shapers of social systems of production (Hollingworth
and Boyer 1997). The interconnectedness of social and economic systems works both
ways. The crucial point of this theoretical understanding is that politics is not an ex-
ogenous variable that can easily be eliminated. Politics is the very essence of resource
management, i.e. of allocating scarce resources (Easton 1953).
As pointed out by Holm (2001), modern fisheries management builds on science and,
if we are to understand fisheries management, we need to understand the role of sci-
ence. The same applies to aquaculture management. Science and scientific knowledge
have to be seen as institutions. In this respect, I have found it fruitful to introduce a so-
cial constructivism perspective. A central element of this perspective is framing, which
may explain why certain solutions have been chosen while others have been neglected
or refuted. According to Holm and Nielsen (2007), a frame is a boundary, and framing
is the process of producing this boundary. In our case, framing can be used on two
levels: first on how problems are perceived and then on how they can be solved. Fram-
ing is central in most science and technology studies (STS), but this is not the place to
explicate the various positions (see Barnes 1982, Bloor 1991, Collins 1992). Actor-
network theory, as developed by Latour (1987, 1993) and other writers in the same
tradition, has proved very useful when considering various elements of resource man-
agement (Holm and Nielsen 2007, Johnsen 2013).
In our case, the regulation of aquaculture implies the use of two very different sets of
management measures; the license regime, which in effect limits the number of com-
petitors, and the locality regulation, which is part of a larger system regulating the use
of coastal space. Both systems can be seen as social constructs, but as soon as they are
established and fortified by institutions, laws, science, stakeholders and lobby groups
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stabilized and may be taken as a fact, or as the (only) solution. Consequently, establish-
ing a new regulatory system implies the creation of new institutions (or the modifica-
tion of old), laws, networks of stakeholders and material artefacts. In our case, a new
regulatory regime is critically dependent on the production of knowledge—that is, on
science—which in turn can be made operational for management interventions.
Aquaculture—a success or a horror story?
According to the fisheries authorities and the industry Norwegian salmon farming is, per
2015, a great success story. During the last 45 years, the industry has grown from under
1,000 tons to 1250,000 tons (salmon and trout). The average annual growth has been
around ten percent, and aquaculture is the most rapidly increasing sector in the entire
Norwegian economy. Norway is the world’s largest producer of Atlantic salmon (salmo
salar). Chile is in second place, with about half of Norway’s production. Salmon and
trout amounted in 2014 to 70 percent of the total value of seafood exports, and salmon
farming has thus in a few years taken over the hegemony within Norwegian seafood
production. The industry employs approximately 10,000 persons directly, i.e. in produ-
cing brood stock, juveniles, on-growth farms, slaughterhouses and directly value-
added processing, while derivative effects in terms of production of intermediate
goods and services employ around 14,000 persons. Many of these jobs are located in
marginal coastal municipalities, which in the same period have experienced a sharp
decline in terms of fishing and fish processing. The seafood industry is currently the
third largest export industry, after petroleum and petroleum related input factors, and
is considered one of the industries that can take over when petroleum activities have
to scale down over the next 30–40 years.
The ambitions for further growth are formidable. The previous government stated in
its report to Parliament that Norway would be “the world’s leading seafood nation” by
inter alia, providing a regulatory framework that increases further growth, based on
biological sustainability (Meld. St. 22 (2012–2013)). The current government is even
more specific: “The Government will follow up the vision of a quadrupling of GDP in
the industry over the next decades …” (Andreassen et al. 2014). Both governments have
largely relied on expert reports from the Royal Norwegian Academy of Sciences
(DKNVS) and the Norwegian Technical Academy (NTVA), which in their report out-
lined a future scenario with a tripling of salmon production in 2030 and increasing five-
fold in 2050 (DKNVS/NTVA 2012). Shortly summarized, “The sky is the limit!” Fig. 1.
This view is by no means shared by the critics. The most eager critics are the sport
fishermen and their organizations, Norges Jeger-og Fiskerforbund3 (organizing the
users) and Norske lakseelver (organizing the river owners).4 They frequently accuse
the fisheries authorities of managing the salmon industry in an unsustainable manner,
to the detriment of the wild stocks. The representatives of the river owners are even
more outspoken, demanding that there be no further increase before a new manage-
ment regime has been established.5 But opposition is not limited to the recreational
sport fishers and river owners. The conservation interest groups have followed suit,
with traditional groups like Norges Naturvernforbund and Natur og ungdom, as well
as the newer NGOs like World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Bellona and Green-
peace, supporting the recreational fishers.
Fig. 1 Quantity produced of Atlantic salmon, nominal export prices. Source: Norwegian Seafood Council
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have for years been rather accommodating vis-à-vis the new industry. They recognize
that many former fishers are now fish farmers and that the industry creates employ-
ment and secures settlements all along the coast. But, with concentration of ownership
and a complete reorganization of the salmon industry during the 1990s, the critics be-
came more predominant. The salmon farming companies, especially in the north, were
soon owned by large national or multinational companies with limited local connec-
tions. Fishers felt that traditional breeding grounds and fishing grounds were threat-
ened, and they often opposed plans suggesting new and expanded areas for the
aquaculture industry. One particular issue caught their attention: the claim that spawn-
ing cod would not return to traditional fjords in the north due to aquaculture farms
located in these fjords. A more recent concern is the massive use of flubenzuroner in
the delousing of infected salmon, which in the next round affects all bottom-dwelling
creatures, including snails, shrimp, crabs and lobster. In sum, fishers are no longer
welcoming the unconditional growth of the salmon industry.
Finally, we have the general public, represented by their local councillors all along the
coast, which is organized into 275 coastal municipalities. As long as the industry offered
new jobs, they welcomed the new salmon industry but, with the more recent develop-
ments, many turned to scepticism and, quite often, straightforward resistance against any
further expansion. This can be explained by the fact that coastal plans, normally worked
out as part of the municipality plan, which is to be revised each fourth year, are costly and
cumbersome to make. One issue is that most small, coastal municipalities lack capacity
and competence to do planning at sea, and therefore need to hire external consultants or
enter into some type of inter-municipality cooperation (Hersoug 2013). The other issue re-
lates to the political costs of manoeuvring a coastal plan with generous allocation to aqua-
culture, which quite often has to be adopted against the interests of fishers, both
professional and recreational, recreational dwellers, conservationists and tourist interests.
By 2014, many municipalities said no to further expansion until they are offered a better
economic deal.
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While the traditional fisheries are subject to one ministry, aquaculture depends on at
least four ministries and their subordinate directorates and supervision. Here we will
briefly look at the two basic elements of the system: the use of licenses (permits) and
the regulation of localities (sea space or sites).
The use of licenses has a long tradition in Norwegian fisheries. The Lysø Committee,
which had been tasked to investigate how the new fish farming industry should be reg-
ulated, also suggested the use of licenses (NOU 1977:39). At the outset, all existing
farms were recorded and, from then on, all new facilities were required to apply for a li-
cense. Each owner could only have one license and, through irregular allocation
rounds, the fisheries authorities could regulate both where (geographically) and who
should be prioritized. Licensing rounds were arranged in 1981, 1984, 1985, 1989, 2002,
2003, 2006 and 2009. In 1991, the ownership restrictions were lifted. It had already
been under pressure for years, since large owners operated with minority interests and
“straw men”, which ensured effective control of several farms (Hovland et al. 2014).
With the bankruptcy of the salmon farmers’ mandatory sales union (Fiskeoppdretternes
Salgslag) in 1991, many salmon farmers went bankrupt, which in turn paved the way
for a large-scale reorganization of the industry (ibid).
From the start, the licenses were regulated according to net pen volume, originally
8000 m3, then 3000 m3, 5000 m3, 8000 m3 and, finally, 12,000 m3. It proved to be a highly
approximate production limitation, because the volume was just measured down to five
meters depth, and many farmers had already acquired nets that were both 20 and 30
meters deep. Later, the volume restriction was combined with feed quotas as a result of
the production limitations following the EU’s threats of trade restrictions due to accu-
sations of Norwegian dumping and use of irregular subsidies. Thus, throughout the
1990s, licenses and quotas acted as production control measures, through which the fish-
eries authorities tried, to the best of their abilities, to limit growth, so that the industry
would not be affected by further trade restrictions. In 2005, feed quotas were replaced by
a system based on maximum allowable biomass (MTB), a system that still persists, despite
criticism from those farmers who carry out extensive processing in Norway. MTB for a
standard license is 780 tons from Nordland County and southwards, while farmers in
Troms and Finnmark have 945 tons as the upper limit. This is to accommodate the
northern locations’ shorter growing seasons, due to lower seawater temperatures.
The present government has decided that the licensing system should remain un-
changed. There are, however, challenges from several quarters, not least by the conser-
vatives who, in opposition, advocated that the system should be discontinued in favour
of a system based on technical approval, i.e. on the basis of environmental consider-
ations only. The Senior Think Tank, a grouping of established fish farmers and people
with solid experience in all aspects of farming operations, has advocated that the state’s
role as “production manager” should be abolished (Seniortanken 2014). Their main ob-
jection is that the aquaculture industry should be treated like any other industry, where
it is up to the actors themselves to determine production volume, within applicable
technical and environmental regulations. Another type of criticism has been that licens-
ing rounds act as “beauty contests”, with applicants promising gold and green forests,
such as further processing, local employment, etc. These promises are seldom checked
and tested, and many of the lucky license winners are selling shortly afterwards,
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regulation is no longer regarded as a production control tool, but as a necessity in
terms of “distribution and scarcity considerations”, which refers to the environment
and optimum use of the coastal zone (NFD 2014).
But a license is not enough. The farmer must also have a site (locality), and in
Norway it is the coastal municipalities that reign over sea space. Planning at sea has,
until now, been a voluntary task, but such plans were earlier on regarded as a precondi-
tion to be awarded farming licenses. In 1985 coastal municipalities got the opportunity
to plan their sea areas to the baselines, i.e. the straight lines connecting the outermost
reefs and islands. In 1989, the area was extended by one nautical mile (1852 m). Thus,
the planning responsibility should coincide with EU’s Water Directive, which Norway
has also acceded. In practice, this means that the municipalities now reign over an area
of about 100,000 km2. Here, municipalities allocate space for aquaculture (A-sites) or
create multipurpose areas where aquaculture is included as one of several possible ac-
tivities (FFFNA-areas). But the process toward an approved locality is long and difficult,
as many considerations and agencies are involved. Proceedings are outlined in Fig. 2,
which states that the Norwegian Food Safety Authority plays a central role as managerFig. 2 Application procedure for aquaculture site (locality)
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Act; the county governors act as managers of a number of laws, primarily the Biological
Diversity Act, the Pollution Control Act and the Open Air Act; while the Directorate of
Fisheries manages the Aquaculture Act and the Marine Resources Act. The county is
responsible for coordinating the proceedings, ensuring the quality assurance of the ap-
plications, and assigning the localities. Each of the afore-mentioned agencies have, in
principle, a veto opportunity in relation to proposals for new farm localities, while the
Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation is called on to mediate if the agen-
cies do not reach agreement with the municipality plan.
No further growth, except
In 2013, the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs was hard pressed. The salmon
farmers had the capacity to produce more, the markets were favourable and profits
were excellent. On the other hand, an increasingly sceptical opinion demanded a full
stop until the two major threats had been solved, or at least significantly reduced. The
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs then came up with a new idea: to introduce a
new type of license, under much stricter conditions than the present ones (which have
a fixed critical limit of a maximum of 0.5 sea lice per fish), and to allocate licenses only
to those able to implement new solutions regarding escapes and sea lice. With an open
competition, a number of promising new solutions could be tested out on an industrial
scale and, within a few years, it was hoped that the industry would be able to cope with
both sea lice and escapes. In sum, it was a large-scale industrial experiment that had
the support of most salmon farmers and did not encounter much resistance from the
traditional opposition groups described above.
One year later, a new conservative/right government had taken over, and it decided to
finalize the allocation of green licenses. In addition, the minister wanted to open for im-
mediate growth, partly in order to compensate for the shelving of another growth pro-
posal to use an average MTB over the year. She therefore proposed that each existing
farmer should be able to increase its MTB volume by five percent under new and very
strict regulations regarding sea lice. The minister also wished to initiate a more predict-
able, long-term growth, under which the growth parameters were fixed and transparent.
A new proposal was therefore presented for public hearing during the fall of 2014 (NFD
2014) and as a White Paper in the spring of 2015 (Meld. St. nr. 16 (2014–2015)).
Finally, a new green management policy was developed, largely under the radar of
most public debate. The Norwegian Food Safety Authority (Mattilsynet) has the task of
controlling fish farms and checking not only public health concerns, but also animal
welfare, according to the mandate granted in the Animal Welfare Act. Based on a sys-
tem of counting sea lice in all sea pens at all farms every week, the Norwegian Food
Safety Authority is able to keep track of the offenders and perform risk based surveil-
lance. In the more serious instances, the Norwegian Food Safety Authority demanded
the slaughter of all or some of the salmon at the farm. By January 2015, the Norwegian
Food Safety Authority made public its list of worst offenders, based on counting sea
lice in 2013 and 2014. In the next round, these companies will be required to halve
their maximum allowable biomass (MTB) on specified locations.6
All four measures can be seen as part of the actual effort of greening the Norwegian
salmon industry, i.e. making the industry more acceptable to the Norwegian public, to
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cent of the salmon produced in Norway. In the following we shall have a closer look at
these four elements.
Green and super-green licenses
In 2011–2012, it was obvious that a further expansion of aquaculture was not on the
agenda. The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs had received strong criticism
from the National Audit Office (Riksrevisjonen 2012) regarding the management of the
Norwegian aquaculture industry, and the planned expansion of five percent of MTB
across the country had to be cancelled. Only farmers in Troms and Finnmark (where
the sea lice problem was relatively small) got the opportunity to increase production.
Meanwhile, there was a strong desire to increase production by the farmers; they had
the capacity and skills, while there were few problems on the market, with some excep-
tions for restrictions in China, and prices were high. The solution was the introduction
of so-called green licenses, with which farmers were given the opportunity to expand
production if they adopted new solutions that could lead to a reduction of sea lice and
escapes. The scheme was eventually relatively complicated, in that the Ministry simul-
taneously wanted to embed both regional priorities and maintain a diverse farming
structure in terms of company size. Furthermore, the Ministry would want to use both
public auction and allocation by fixed price. Finally, the environmental criteria were
differentiated, as 35 of the allocated licenses should have an upper limit of 0.25 adult
female sea lice per salmon, while ten licenses had to commit themselves to maximum
of 0.10 sea lice per salmon. The distribution of the different groups and conditions is
illustrated in Fig. 3.
The assignment process was organized so that a small group of professionals, headed
by a lawyer, accounted for the selection, based on criteria that were prepared in ad-
vance. They chose to concentrate on measures that would reduce the incidence of sea
lice and the risk of escapes. In practice, this implied a variety of louse defeating devices,
which ranged from the use of skirts (outside the net pens) to the use of laser cannons
to shoot sea lice. Furthermore, the use of large smolt (up to one kilo, produced on
land-based facilities) and triploid salmon was prioritized. Interest was great and 255 ap-
plications were received in all. Groups A and B are now finally awarded, while in Group
C there are still legal complaints, and final allocation is not expected until the appeals
procedure is completed, which will probably occur in the summer of 2015. It is also
important to note that, in Groups A and B, companies must commit themselves to
redeem an existing license per awarded license, which will also run on green terms.
This means that, when the scheme is implemented, there will be 80 licenses that will
be run on green terms, of which ten will be run on stringent or super-green condi-
tions (0.1 sea lice).
An incremental step: five percent increase on strict conditions
For a long time, the present MTB-regime regulating production has been heatedly de-
bated. An expert committee, looking into the pros and cons, concluded in 2013 by
recommending the use of an average MTB (over the year) instead of the present system
of using the given MTB as an absolute ceiling at any time (Guttormsen et al. 2013).
However, the farmers were split; while some of the large companies preferred this more
Fig. 3 The allocation of green licenses in 2014
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the Minister of Fisheries decided to drop the proposal and instead introduced a new
offer to the fish farmers: the possibility of buying a five percent increase, provided that
they were able to keep the sea lice level down to 0.1 during a production cycle with a
maximum of two delousing treatments. The offer was presented in the summer of
2014 and could be effective a year later, depending on the reactions of the fish farmers
and other stakeholders.
The fish farmers, represented by their generic organization FHL, were in principle in
favour of the opportunity to increase production. They also found the price acceptable
(1.5 million NOK for a five percent increase), but they found the suggested regime un-
tenable. The suggested level of 0.1 sea lice per license was found unrealistic and the
sanctions were seen as risky (economic fines and, ultimately, withdrawal of the increase
without compensation). In addition, the farmers found it difficult that the fisheries
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0.25 and one with 0.5 sea lice. In the spring of 2015, the offer was repeated, in a slightly
modified version (a lower price and an extended deadline). The actual number of
farmers responding positively to this offer will first be known in 2016. At the outset, it
is expected that farmers with small sea lice problems will probably be interested, while
others are sceptical and will wait and see, their final decision depending, among other
factors, on the possibility of transferring licenses across administrative regions.7 Among
the sceptics, the attitude is fairly uniform; there should be no increase whatsoever until
the problems of sea lice and escapes have been solved.
A new allocation regime
While the outgoing Labour/centre/left government tried to get around the political lim-
itations on further growth by introducing green licenses, the new conservative/right
government proposed a completely new policy regulating growth. The proposal, intro-
duced in 2014, was sent out for public hearing with a view to be presented for the Nor-
wegian Parliament by late spring 2015. The proposal is concerned with the lack of
clarity regarding future growth in the salmon sector, and tries to suggest a predictable
growth path, thus reducing the uncertainty for salmon farmers. Right from the begin-
ning, the authorities stressed that the future growth of the sector has to take place
within a sustainable framework. This means that further growth will be determined by
biological sustainability, as defined by various possible parameters. The proposal, which
was later developed into a White Paper, contained three alternatives for further growth:
1. The first implies “business as usual”, i.e. to continue the present practice of allocating
new licenses through license rounds, when the government sees fit. However,
the new government is adamant that licenses from now on shall be allocated on
“objective criteria”, not on shifting political likes and dislikes.
2. The second suggests that growth shall be determined by a fixed annual growth
rate, leaving the environmental concerns to other regulatory measures.
3. The third is to make growth dependent on an operational management rule (similar
to the Operational Management Procedures we find in fisheries management).
Predictability is here secured by a set of environmental indicators that are
decisive for growth (or reduction) of production.
The Ministry made no attempt to hide that the third alternative was its preferred so-
lution, and used most of the 60-page document to spell out how such a system could
be set up and how it would operate in practice. We do not have the space to elaborate
the proposal in detail, but suffice it to say that a number of questions are left open,
with the request that stakeholders comment and, if they disagree, to come up with bet-
ter solutions. The groundwork for the proposal was made by an expert group, the Area
Committee, which delivered its report in 2010. The main idea of this report was to div-
ide the coast into different production areas and manage growth according to fish mor-
tality as the central indicator. While the idea of using production areas and put-out
zones received wide acclaim, the use of fish mortality as the main indicator met with
stern resistance. So when the idea was taken up again in 2014, the main indicator was
changed to the frequency of sea lice in a particular area. For the sake of illustration, the
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ticular area (different from the present seven management areas). Critical values have
been suggested, similar to what we find in the fisheries management system, where
traffic lights (green, yellow and red) indicate where growth can take place, what areas
are under observation, and what areas require reduction in terms of annual production,
as measured by allowable biomass (MTB). Other indicators can be connected to the
system, such as local and regional pollution, but at this stage, only the frequency of sea
lice has been developed to the necessary sophisticated level to be used as an indicator.
The idea behind the proposal is not only to regulate growth, but to make the salmon
farmers collectively more responsible for the environmental standard in their produc-
tion areas. For obvious reasons, the presence of sea lice will vary from one put-out zone
to another, thus paving the way for different grading within a production area. But in
the end, the different grades will be weighted and the area will be assigned a value or
traffic light colour. On the issue of how production capacity shall be allocated, the pro-
posal suggests a Solomonic solution that partly increases capacity via annual or semi-
annual license rounds and allows existing farmers to expand by a certain percentage. In
terms of payment, the Ministry prefers the public auction of new licenses, while also
allowing the use of fixed prices and lottery. For fear of subsidy or dumping allegations
(primarily from the EU), the Ministry will not prioritize any particular group in terms
of size (small-scale versus large-scale) or in terms of preferred technical solutions. “The
Ministry considers biological sustainability the most important requirement for future
growth, while the market seems not to be a reason why the authorities shall regulate
the production capacity” (NFD 2014: 22). Nevertheless, the Ministry insists on main-
taining the license system untouched, although the actual production connected to
each license will vary depending on where it is located and how well the farmers in the
area are able to reduce the sea lice level.
At this stage, it is important to stress that the new regulatory regime is still on the
drawing table and many details are to be decided at a later stage, not least influenced
by a rather diversified response from the various stakeholders, who often combine ele-
ments from all three solutions to create their preferred options.
A new regime of sanctions
While green licenses and any new farming regime will produce results sometime in the
future, it is already one regime that is operational. The sanctions’ regime builds on the
simple logic of reducing the MTB at farm level, based on long time violation of given
louse limits (0.5 adult female sea lice per salmon). The Norwegian Food Safety Author-
ity (Mattilsynet), which is responsible for the organization of the system, has for a long
time had the authority to impose restrictions on farmers and, at worst, require the
slaughtering of fish. The Norwegian Food Safety Authority has systematized sea lice
data for 2013 and 2014 based on weekly reported counts, which makes it possible to
pick out the worst offenders in the first place, i.e. localities that, over a long time, have
had sea lice over the allowed limit. In January 2015 these farms have received a warning
letter stating that stocking up on these sites must be halved in the next round (produc-
tion cycle). This does not mean that the company must halve its MTB, but that the
company in this case must find other localities where the company’s given license MTB
can be placed. What is interesting to note, is that company size does not seem to have
Fig. 4 Distribution of different size groups in terms of having sea lice infested localities. Source: Moen,
NFA (2015)
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from Fig. 4, all size categories have red localities (ranging from 21 to 40 percent).
The measure has, as expected, triggered strong reactions. The publication of the
companies included on the list and the use of data are highly controversial issues, but
the Norwegian Food Safety Authority seems to have strong support in the Ministry of
Industry and Fisheries that the measures will be implemented as planned, and that
the authorities will take complaints and possible litigations as they come.
Discussion
In the proposal for a new growth regime, it is clearly stated that the industry does not
need the state to regulate production according to market needs. Nevertheless, it is
equally clear that the government has no intention of changing the existing license re-
gime. This may at the outset seem somewhat paradoxical, but makes sense when one
considers the values involved. At the last auction of salmon licenses (in 2014), prices
were in the range of 55 to 66 million NOK. If we make a calculation based on the more
modest average of 40 million NOK per license, the value of the 1,000 licenses allocated
so far will be in the order of 40 billion NOK. No owner would like to see these values
scrapped overnight, not least because many have bank loans where the license values
are used as collateral.
However, the present license regime has many drawbacks. The most important is that
it is very hard for newcomers to enter the industry. They can, of course, buy a license
on the open market, but an entry ticket of 40 million NOK is too much for most pro-
spective entrants. This means that the industry is nearly closed to newcomers, which
creates the risk of blocking new ideas. In recent years ownership has been heavily con-
centrated. Although there are still 130 companies involved, with 89 owners, the ten lar-
gest are actually producing 80 percent of the quantity (NFD 2014).8 Over time, the
ownership concentration has seemed to increase even further, not necessarily due to
economies of scale in the actual production, but due to the advantages of handling all
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organ of the European Economic Space agreement) has overruled the previous Norwe-
gian ownership regulation of a maximum of 25 percent of the total number of licenses,
and instead set maximum ownership at 40 percent. This has, somewhat hesitantly, been
accepted by the previous government, so long as certain requirements regarding further
processing, research and the use of labour are fulfilled.9
The four management measures described above have one feature in common: they
are all based on one simple indicator, namely the frequency of sea lice (adult, female
sea lice) as reported by the farmers themselves and controlled by the Norwegian Food
Safety Authority. This implies that the question of sustainability has been framed as a
question of biological sustainability, i.e. of not affecting the wild salmon and trout nega-
tively. The indicator and critical threshold values have been defined, which in turn have
been transformed to a simple system of traffic lights (red, yellow and green). The suc-
cess of such a regime will therefore depend on whether the authorities are able to
stabilize the regime, i.e. to get the system accepted and institutionalized. Along this
route, there are several challenges. The first relates to the connection between the fre-
quency of sea lice and the status of the wild salmon and trout stocks. While the Insti-
tute of Marine Research is proclaiming a definite and clear connection, other
researchers and the farmers themselves point to other factors explaining the poor con-
ditions for out-migrating wild salmon and trout (FHL 2015, Bellona 2015). Basing the
environmental state on one indicator only may also seem like a risky strategy, although
the Ministry is open to adding more indicators (such as pollution) at a later stage.
Secondly, the critical values are still being debated, and while 0.5 sea lice per salmon
seems to be accepted as a common denominator, the new limits introduced by the green
licenses (0.25 and 0.1) are by many experts considered unrealistic. Many farmers still de-
mand a more scientific explanation for the fixed critical values, although most seem to
accept that keeping down the level of sea lice, will, in general, reduce the impact on wild
salmon and trout. Even better (for the farmers), this will, if successful, reduce the costs of
delousing, which already constitute more than 3 billion NOK per year.
Thirdly, many stakeholders, both inside and outside the industry, doubt the counting
regime that has been established, and accuse some farmers of under-reporting. The au-
thorized count by the Norwegian Food Safety Authority is accepted, but the NFA will,
in any case, only be able to control a few farms every week. Fourthly, the public sanc-
tions are heatedly debated. Slaughtering part of or an entire batch of salmon will of
course have dramatic economic consequences, as will the requirement of halving the
put-out for the next production cycle on specific locations, as is now being imple-
mented by the NFA’s sanctions’ regime. Many farmers and their organizations have
already warned that they find the collective punishment inherent in the new growth re-
gime unfair and illegal. All farmers in an area could be forced to reduce their put-out
due to the practice of one bad farmer. Fig. 5.
Last but not least, the new proposed growth regime (measure no. 3) seems to con-
found two different but closely related systems: the license system, which gives a person
or a company the right to farm, and the locality (site) system, which allocates space
where one might farm. So far, these two systems have been kept isolated, as the right to
farm is a prerequisite to apply for a site, but not the other way around. The right to
farm has been decided by the state (the Ministry), while the site allocation is, in
Fig. 5 New management measures according to license MTB and locality MTB
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the process and the final distribution. By suggesting, as in the new proposal, that com-
panies risk their license MTB if they do not comply with the environmental require-
ments as measured by the sea lice indicator, the authorities mix the two systems, which
may not be the most convenient way of obtaining the goal that all partners share
(a sustainable salmon industry).
In that respect, the “new” sanctions regime is built upon a different logic, under which
specific sites are monitored and required to reduce MTB for the next production cycle.
Sites are here the central theme, not the licenses and their accompanying MTB. It should
also be mentioned that the responsible authority (the Norwegian Food Safety Authority)
already has the mandate to reduce production in entire areas with a bad environmental
standard. The Norwegian Food Safety Authority may reduce the MTB on such localities
and also refuse to grant permission to new localities. The possibility that companies’
license MTB can be reduced may open a host of legal claims as to the legality of this
measure. The comments from the Directorate of Fisheries (2015) to the proposed new
growth regime speak for themselves:
“The consultation paper envisages a radical change of management regime for
Norwegian aquaculture. This will partly require a significant research work,
extensive rulemaking, significant changes in management, restructuring of registers
besides changes and strengthening of audit. The production areas must be created in
separate regulations, which also contain the necessary procedural rules for changes.
The operation of a system of production areas is difficult to realize widath the
current fragmented management system. A system of production areas involves a
more complicated administration itself, and will be very demanding with the current
roles and responsibilities.” (Author’s transl.).
Hence, the administrative organ most closely involved with the present regime con-
siders the new management regime “a radical change” and “very demanding”. While
green licenses may be seen as a front-runner of a new regime, the actual proposal of
the traffic light system is the full implementation of a more environmentally oriented
production system. Whether this system will be viable (fully institutionalized) depends
not only on governmental will (political support in the Norwegian parliament) and the
acceptance of and cooperation with the major stakeholders (farmers as well as environ-
mental NGOs), but also on scientific backing (solid science to support the indicators,
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salmon). Shortly summarized; the green licenses, the five percent increase and the
current sanctions’ regime operated by the Norwegian Food Safety Authority can all be
seen as modifications of the existing management regime, although they contain a
number of new elements and principles. The suggested new management regime
(based on increasing or reducing the license MTB) is an entirely new approach, which
may require dramatic changes in the institutional set-up of the sector administration.
All four initiatives depend critically on the quality of the science involved to prove
sustainability, i.e. whether the scientific results are being accepted by the stakeholders
and the larger public (including foreign consumers).
The discussion so far has been limited to Norwegian salmon farming, but the reforms
under way may also have repercussions for other salmon producing countries. While it
may be argued that the policy of diversification into other countries (Chile, Canada,
Ireland, and Scotland) by Norwegian salmon producers originally may have postponed
stronger regulations at home, the management logic also works the other way around.
Stronger demands on safety for escapes and improved treatment of sea lice in Norway
will, within relatively short time, be transferred to other countries where the multi-
national companies are involved (Perkins 2010). Over time, these demands will be in-
corporated into “best practices” and may also be included in international standards,
such as the Aquaculture Stewardship Council’s Salmon Standard.
Conclusion
Through the new initiative of providing “green growth”, the past and present govern-
ments have tried to circumvent the impasse created by massive problems connected to
sea lice and escapes. We have earlier claimed that Norwegian salmon production is not
limited by lack of space or by exceeding ecological limits (Hersoug and Johnsen 2012).
The main issue is what is acceptable in terms of ecological footprints to Norwegian
politicians (acting on behalf of the Norwegian people) and, in a similar manner, what is
acceptable to foreign consumers, who are increasingly occupied with sustainability con-
cerns. At present (spring 2015), the government is hard pressed between an industry
that would like to expand further, having both the capacity and the markets, and an in-
creasingly sceptical public opinion, which clamours for no further expansion until the
main challenges have been solved. In this situation, at least three other public debates
are interfering to complicate a political solution. The first is a technical, scientific de-
bate: how can sustainability be measured, monitored and used as the main mechanism
for regulating growth? The second applies to how the proceeds from the very profitable
salmon sector should be divided, i.e. to what extent should the municipalities managing
the near shore sea areas on behalf of the Norwegian people receive an area fee (in
addition to a share of the license fees).10 The third relates to the sale of Norwegian
companies, which offers Norwegian sea territories to foreign companies free of
charge.11 This presentation of the greening of the Norwegian salmon industry has not
suggested any easy way out of these conflicts. Whether the green licenses are successful
in producing the results promised in terms of reduced sea lice and escapes remains to
be seen. The large number of technical solutions now being implemented is by all
means promising, but the jury is still out as to tangible results. The promise of a five
percent increase in production volume (MTB) in return for much stricter limits
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the new proposed growth regime will be implemented is even more uncertain; it de-
pends not only on the technical feasibility but also on gaining the political support and
cooperation of salmon farmers. The new sanctions regime has already been introduced,
but we have still not seen the results and definitely not the legal reactions of those who
are affected (having to reduce their MTB to half on certain “red” localities).
According to a former prime minister (Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland), “Everything is
dependent on everything”.12 This seems to be an apt description of the current situ-
ation in the aquaculture industry. Further growth cannot be obtained before the indus-
try has succeeded in reducing its ecological footprints as measured in terms of
frequency of sea lice and escapes. Whether the new management measures (the green
licenses, the five percent increase, the growth regime and the sanctions regime) will
produce the expected results remains to be seen. Using the Actor Network Theory ter-
minology, it depends on whether all the necessary steps toward a new regime can be
stabilized, accepted as legitimate and supported by science. This is by no means secure.
The different debates related to the use of sea lice as the main indicator in all the sug-
gested management reforms indicate that the new framework is far from taken for
granted. Regarding the question of institutional reform, the crucial question is how to
institute a new management regime where future production is dependent on environ-
mental considerations while at the same time presenting predictable growth opportun-
ities to the salmon farmers. In many ways, it is a question of “squaring the circle”.
Predictable, actual growth cannot possibly be guaranteed if it is dependent on changing
environmental conditions. Increased license MTB may be granted, but whether the
growth will be realized depends on the environmental conditions on the site or area
level, which at present depends on the farmers’ ability to reduce sea lice and escapes.
Based on risk analysis, we may say that the political risk of operating in Norway will in-
crease. However, if the regime turns out to be successful, the biological risk will be con-
siderably reduced, thus improving not only legitimacy but also profits.
In the short run, the main challenges are connected to reducing sea lice and escapes.
In this context, four new initiatives have been presented, all with good intentions but
variable degrees of probability that the problems they address will be solved. As soon
as these problems have been solved or considerably reduced, the area issue is going to
resurface. Larger and better areas are definitely needed if the industry is going to ex-
pand as planned (Arealutvalget 2010, Hersoug and Johnsen 2012). The willingness to
grant new areas to the aquaculture industry depends in the last instance on legitima-
cy—on whether the demands of the industry are seen as legitimate and valid. The
attempts of greening the industry may, from this perspective, be seen as a prepar-
ation for the larger battle—the battle for space, which is bound to be the central
issue if the Norwegian industry is going to increase its production five-fold by 2050.
It is still an open question whether a greening of the existing management institu-
tions is sufficient or if this dramatic increase would require a wholesale institutional
reform. A third possibility is that the present conflicts will be reduced as a result of
new technological solutions, such as transferring the production onshore or further
offshore. While the first option certainly will reduce the comparative advantage of
Norwegian producers, who have access to large areas of sheltered sea waters, the
second will require large investments in new technology, and thus drive the industry
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a compromise that allows for the continuation of the present success of open or
semi-open salmon farming in net pens in the fjords while, at the same time, redu-
cing the environmental problems.Endnotes
1http://www.ilaks.no/solberg-laks-er-det-norske-ikea/.
2Maximum allowable biomass is here indicated by the Norwegian acronym MTB
(Maksimalt Tillatt Biomasse).
3All Norwegian organizations are presented by their Norwegian names, in italics.
4The organization represents rights holders and river associations in 70 salmon rivers.
Members are spread across the entire country. Through local chapters Norwegian Salmon
Rivers represents approximately 7000 rights holders. It constitutes about 70 percent of all
licensees to salmon rivers in Norway.
5http://www.lakseelver.no/Nyheter/2015/januar/Pressemelding%20vekst.pdf.
6It should be noted that the MTB should be halved on specific locations, not affecting
the MTB guaranteed by the license. In principle the affected companies will then have to
find other (and better) localities for the production being reduced. If small companies
have only few localities that are all being restricted, this will, other factors equal, reduce
the company’s total production. This will in the end, be left to the discretion of the Food
Authority.
7At present licenses are geographically bound to the seven administrative regions of
the Fisheries Directorate.
8In Chile there are 24 companies controlling 80 percent of the total production.
9The present government has suggested that these requirements should be
scrapped in 2015, thus leaving the salmon sector on an equal footing with most
other industries.
10The main income of the municipalities is income tax and economic transfers
from the state. Until 1999 part of the company tax was allocated to the municipalities.
Today the tax goes directly to the state and is then redistributed through the economic
transfer to the municipalities (Isaksen and Mikkelsen 2012).
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